Politische Risiken in Afrika: Die Temperatur steigt an.

Afrika hat in den letzten Monaten eine Vielzahl politischer Ereignisse erlebt. Wo werden sich nach der Verschlechterung der Sicherheitslage im Sahel, sowie der durch den Druck der Strasse erzwungenen Abreise historischer Führer aus Algerien und Sudan, die politischen Risiken in der zweiten Jahreshälfte manifestieren?

Mit ihrem im März 2017 erstellten quantitativen politischen Risikomodell will Coface – über das durch die aktuellen Ereignisse vorgegebene Tempo hinaus – die jüngsten politischen Risikoentwicklungen und damit die zu beobachtenden Länder identifizieren.

(Publikation ist nur in ENG und FRA erhältlich)

Over the recent decades, regular conflicts of varying intensities and natures have marked Africa, leading notably to a decline in investment and trade flows, delaying the development of some African countries. Recent years have seen a resurgence of conflicts on the continent, mainly as a result of the activities of various Islamist groups, particularly in the Sahel region, mobilizing the armed forces of certain states on the continent and targeting civilian populations. Conflicts of political origin – sometimes mixed with ethnic, religious or even linguistic considerations – also remain present in Africa (Libya, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon...).

Our indices of political violence also confi rm that violent events (conflicts and/ or terrorist acts), although more localised, have become relatively common again, particularly in the Sahel, compared to the beginning of the 21st century: compared to 2008, there were almost twice as many conflicts across the continent in 2018.

Moreover, as events in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 have shown, as mobilisation instruments develop, the exasperation of populations, fuelled by socio-economic pressures exposes some countries to the risk of future instability. Although large-scale conflicts, as in Libya, or regime changes are not a given, a fragile socio-economic context can, in the long term, cause unrest that can generate, at a minimum, uncertainty in the political environment. Our political and social fragility index indicates that 10 countries – Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Uganda and the DRC – could be or continue to be affected in the foreseeable future. The increase in mobilisation instruments is one of the factors behind the increased risk. This dynamic, in force throughout the continent, could potentially lead to a multiplication of destabilizing political events in Africa in the longer-term.

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