Moderate growth continues with external trade being the big question mark
The Belgian economy is set for another year of moderate growth in 2026. Foreign trade will be an important factor in this development. Belgium, together with the Netherlands, is considered the major trading platform in Europe. Since 14 August 2025, a new trade agreement between the EU and the US has been in force providing for a blanket tariff of 15% on all goods exported to the US. This includes cars and car parts, but not steel and aluminium, which continue to be subject to a 50% tariff. It also remains unclear whether pharmaceutical products will be subject to the 15% tariff or a higher one in the future. These products have been exempted until now. Other exemptions to the 15% tariff also remain unclear. For Belgium as a producer, the US is the fourth-largest export destination, accounting for 7% of total exports. Pharmaceutical products account by far for the largest share of exports – registering 20% of all exports to the US. Even if the final tariff has not been set, demand for pharmaceutical products is not particularly sensitive to higher prices and would therefore undergo a limited decrease in demand. The situation is different for machinery (8% of Belgian exports to the US) and cars (5%), which are more likely to be affected. Much more than the direct effects, the indirect effects could hit Belgium through lower demand from Germany, the Netherlands and France, its three biggest export partners. Currently, a decline in demand in Europe is (still) being offset by increased demand from China from the US, but this is likely to be a short-term rather than a long-term effect. In addition, Belgian imports of defence equipment are expected to increase significantly. The new government has committed to NATO's 2% of GDP target on defence spending and should achieve this for the first time in 2025 (in 2024, spending still stood at 1.3% of GDP). By 2034, spending should be at least 2.5%. However, as Belgium itself produces little military equipment, many investments will involve imports.
Private consumption lost some of its strong 2024 drive in the first half of 2025. Spending is expected to stabilise or even rebound slightly in the upcoming quarters as purchasing power is traditionally kept stable. Belgian households have the advantage of automatic indexation of wages, pensions, and cost of living benefits, which is copied by most unions and employers. While gross hourly wages increased by 2.4% in 2024, the central bank of Belgium expects a 3.3% increase in 2025 (mainly due to the adaptation of wages in January 2025 and the 2% increase in the minimum wage in June 2025) that should slow to 1.6% in 2026. The next increase in overall wages is planned for January 2026, but given lower inflationary pressures – the result of lower energy prices and stabilised food and service prices – this one should be noticeably lower.
Investment by companies remains very uncertain. While the pharmaceutical sector benefits from being relatively independent from economic developments and could be less impacted by the US tariffs than others, the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook could inhibit stronger growth in other sectors. That said, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy could at least provide some financial support. In the first half of 2025 its main interest rate (deposit rate) was cut by a total of 0.5 percentage points to 2%, which is considered the neutral level. Given the eurozone’s expected modest economic growth and a stable inflation outlook, two more 25 basis-point cuts could be made by the end of 2025. Although the key interest rate is likely to remain unchanged in 2026, two further cuts are possible if the economic recovery continues to be tepid. Investment in the construction sector should benefit from the lower rate. Given the low level of building permits (especially in the private sector) in the spring of 2025, the sector is only expected to recover towards late 2025 or early 2026. Public expenditure and investment should continue to be sizeable in 2025, before stabilising in 2026. First, Belgium is still eligible for EUR 5.3 billion (0.9% of GDP) under the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, with the majority directed towards infrastructure projects in the coming years. By the end of May 2025, 29% of the funds had already been paid out. Disbursements are contingent on EU budget provisions, which the excessive deficit procedure against Belgium may influence. However, the government has implemented initial measures to stabilise the budget so investment projects should continue.
EU excessive budget procedure continues, but major reforms have been decided
Belgium was slapped with an EU excessive budget procedure in June 2024, forcing it to reduce its public deficit and bring its finances back to comply with Maastricht criteria over the next four to seven years. In June 2025, the EU confirmed Belgium’s status and is proposing that the growth rate of net expenditures should not exceed 3.6% in 2025 and 2.5% in 2026. In response, the government initiated several large-scale reforms that should be slowly implemented. A pension reform was put in place in January 2025 that increases the retirement age from 65 to 66 this year and to 67 years as of 2030. A special bonus is given to retirees who work longer and the requirements to get the minimum-pension became stricter (if not met, there is still a basic payment that covers the minimum level of living costs). In 2026, labour market reforms are set to follow. First, labour law is being made more flexible with the reintroduction of probationary periods (six months with one week’s notice), a cap on severance payments, the possibility of more voluntary overtime, the possibility of extending monthly working hours and the abolition of night work bans. Second, changes are being make to unemployment benefit rules. Previously, there was no fixed limit on the duration of said benefits, but they will henceforth be limited to a maximum of two years. The effects of these reforms will probably be visible only progressively. The effect of these policy changes to public expenditures, which will increase again in 2025, due to the pegging of public wages and pensions to inflation, should subsequently stabilise. Furthermore, interest payments on Belgium’s high debt load are having a noticeable impact on the budget. From 2026, a tax reform should increase revenues, which should include a 10% capital gains tax on share sales generating net profit of over EUR 10,000. Nevertheless, it will take time to make any noticeable changes to the financial situation.
The minor current account deficit will probably continue in 2025 and 2026. The trade in goods surplus, which could decrease due to US tariffs and sluggish activity in Western Europe, together with the traditional sizeable primary income surplus (created by strong revenues from investments abroad) will be more than balanced by the noticeable trade in service deficit and the secondary income deficit due to foreign workers’ remittances.
Federal “Arizona” coalition is working, but the Brussels region still lacks a government
Bart de Wever, from the N-VA, was sworn in as Prime Minister in February 2025. He is the first Flemish separatist politician to hold this office. De Wever is leading the so-called “Arizona” coalition named after the colours of its five component parties that exist in the flag of the US state. Forming a coalition in Belgium is not easy. Most political orientations are each represented by two parties, one Flemish and one Walloon. This means that several orientations, with their regional variants, must manage to agree on common ground. It took eight months after the general and regional elections in June 2024 to lock in an agreement. Besides the N-VA, the coalition includes the Walloon liberals (MR), the Walloon centrists (LE), the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) and last, as its only left-wing party, the Flemish socio-democrats (Vooruit). The government is facing extensive pressure from the EU deficit procedure and the resulting austerity measures on the one hand and the unions and other interest groups on the other. Unions have organised general strikes since the early spring of 2025. Furthermore, the newly introduced tax reform – especially the capital gains tax – continues to be a controversial issue between the MR and the Vooruit.
While we expect the federal coalition to remain in office until the next scheduled election in 2029, there is still no new government in the Brussels region. The regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) play an important role in Belgium as their competences and the significant differences between regional parties impact their respective economic and political orientations. The lion’s share of economic policy in the shape of business promotion, the implementation of some labour market measures, infrastructure, housing and urban development, and agriculture, is administered regionally, and it is only with the support of these three regions that Belgium is fully capable of acting. In Flanders, the government was sworn in at the end of September 2024. The N-VA continues to lead with the CD&V and, more recently, the Vooruit. In Wallonia, a government was formed within a few weeks by the Walloon liberals (MR) and the LE. In the Brussels region, however, no solution exists more than a year after the election. Talks are currently ongoing between the two largest Walloon parties, the MR and the social democratic PS, but neither would have an absolute majority on their own and would not include any Flemish representation. The political gridlock in Brussels may therefore extend into autumn or even winter.